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A sample game is illustrated in Figure 1 . Note that Player 2 (the authors) won by "sacrificing" our lowest-ranked cards (G and F) against Player 1's highest (A and B, in that order). If we had played the "naïve" strategy (A vs A, B vs B, etc.), we would have lost.
This example already suggests a number of interesting mathematical questions.
1. Can Player 2 win more than 50 percent of the tricks on average? 2. (a) If so, what strategy gives Player 2 the highest probability of winning? (b) What strategy gives Player 2 the largest expected number of tricks won? 3. How does the optimal number of tricks to sacrifice depend on n? Which cards should we sacrifice, and against which cards of the opponent?
The solution to question 2a is quite easy. The optimal strategy for winning is to play our highest n/2 + 1 cards against Player 1's lowest n/2 + 1 cards in reverse order. On the other hand, question 2b leads to a very interesting and subtle linear assignment problem. The solution draws on ingredients from fields outside combinatorics, such as group theory and real analysis, and we think it will be surprising even to experts. In the next section of this paper, we will present some historical background to question 2, which is almost 2500 years old. The cost matrices section explains the reduction of 2b to a linear assignment problem and collects some important facts about the cost matrix (such as symmetry). The subsequent two sections narrow down the possible optimal strategies to a very small subset, then the following section sketches the most technical part of the proof, the "no-gaps theorem," which enables us to identify an optimal strategy for any number n. The paper concludes with a discussion of the Hungarian algorithm and a modification we developed.
The Supplementary Online Materials contain two documents. The first presents the remaining details of the proof of the optimal strategy. The second, which assumes some familiarity with linear algebra and linear optimization problems, explains an alternative approach to the problem via a modified Hungarian algorithm that preserves the symmetry of the cost matrix.
History
The story of One-Round War dates back at least to the fourth century BCE. According to legend, the king of Qi challenged one of his generals, Tian Ji, to a match of three horse races. The general's advisor, a man named Sun Bin, suggested that the general should sacrifice one race, by racing his worst horse against the emperor's best. In this way the other two horses would face easier competition. Tian Ji won those two races and the match. Sun Bin thereby earned a reputation as a strategical genius, and enjoyed a long and successful career [4] .
The earliest modern reference we have found to this problem is [2] , which discusses the optimal ordering of players in a sports match between two teams. (Of course, in most actual sporting competitions, such a reordering of players would be unethical.) The authors set up a linear assignment problem, but did not actually solve it.
Howard Stern, as a Massachusetts Institute of Technology graduate student, rediscovered the problem around 1980 [6] . Stern proved that if n ≥ 3, then Player 2 can win more than n/2 tricks on average by strategic play. (This answers question 1 in the affirmative.) He found the optimal strategy (in the sense of question 2b) for all n such that 3 ≤ n ≤ 13. Most importantly, he proved that for all n the optimal strategy involves dividing Player 2's hand into two sets, which we could call the "sacrificial" cards and the "ringer" cards. It is never optimal to play a card against an equally ranked card (e.g., C against C). The sacrificial cards should always be played in reverse alphabetical order against higher cards of the opponent (e.g., G against A and F against B). The ringer cards should be played in forward alphabetical order (e.g., A, B, C, D, E) against lower cards of the opponent (C, D, E, F, G). However, Stern was not able to derive a theorem for how many cards should be sacrificed, which ones, or which cards of the opponent they should be sacrificed against.
The idea of One-Round War arose in discussions between the second author and Gary Antonick, who edits the Numberplay blog. In the card game, the probability p i j that the ith weakest player on one team will beat the jth strongest player on the opposing team can be explicitly computed. In most sporting competitions, such as horse races, these probabilities are not known exactly. Hence the card game leads to a better-defined problem from the mathematical point of view. However, we think our results would be of interest in other sports.
Cost matrices
In a linear assignment problem, we are given an equal number of agents and tasks and, for each (agent, task) pair, the cost of that agent performing that task. The problem is to assign exactly one task to each agent so as to minimize the sum of the costs of each agent performing his or her assigned task.
Our problem is an example of a linear assignment problem with one player's cards corresponding to the agents and the other player's cards corresponding to the tasks. In our case, the cost to Player 2 is the expected number of tricks that she will lose, which is simply the sum of the probabilities that she will lose each trick.
We write the costs as a matrix P. In order to work with whole numbers, we normalize the probabilities by the total number of possible deals, which is simply 2n n . To ensure that the cost matrix is symmetric, we order Player 1's cards from lowest to highest and Player 2's cards from highest to lowest. Thus P i j represents the number of deals in which the jth highest card of Player 2 loses to the ith lowest, or (n + 1 − i)th highest, card of Player 1.
For general n, we can compute the entries of the cost matrix as follows. Let a ik represent the number of deals in which the (n + 1 − i)th ranked card of Player 1 is the (n − i + k)th ranked card overall. This implies that of the top n − i + k − 1 ranked cards overall, n − i are from Player 1 and k − 1 are from Player 2. Likewise, of the n + i − k lowest ranked cards overall, i − 1 are from Player 1 and n + 1 − k are from Player 2. Therefore,
Observe that when the (n + 1 − i)th ranked card from Player 1 is the (n − i + k)th ranked card overall, then that card will beat any of the cards ranked among the bottom n + 1 − k from Player 2. The jth ranked card from Player 2 is among the bottom n + 1 − k whenever k ≤ j. It follows that P i j = j k=1 a ik . As an illustration, when each player has three cards, there are A strategy is a choice of one element in each row and column and its cost is the sum of the chosen elements. For the naive strategy, the cost is P 13 + P 22 + P 31 = 30. This means Player 2 loses 30/20 = 1.5 tricks on average. By contrast, the cost of Sun Bin's strategy is P 12 + P 21 + P 33 = 27, meaning that Player 2 can expect to lose 27/20 = 1.35 tricks on average. It is easy to confirm by trial and error that Sun Bin's strategy is in fact the best of all 3! = 6 possible strategies. With seven cards, the total number of deals is 14 7
= 3432 and the cost matrix 
Now there are 7! = 5040 possible strategies, so it is clear that trial and error is not a very good approach to the problem. [5] or the Supplementary Online Materials for proofs.)
Lemma 1 (Properties of the Cost Matrix). (See
1. Symmetry: P i j = P ji . 2. Complementarity: P i, j + P n+1− j,n+1−i = 2n n .
3a. Modularity around the main antidiagonal: For any i and j,
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the inequality is strict. 3c. Submodularity below the main antidiagonal: Let i, j, k, l be such that i
< k, j < l, i + l ≥ n + 1, and k + j ≥ n + 1. Then P i j + P kl ≤ P il + P k j . If i + l > n + 1 or k + j > n + 1, then P i j + P kl < P il + P k j , i.e.,
the inequality is strict.
The main antidiagonal (MAD) is the diagonal that runs from southwest (SW) to northeast (NE) in the cost matrix. A good mnemonic device for understanding property 3 is the following. Choose any four elements that form a 2 × 2 rectangle. If two of the four corners lie on the MAD, then NE + SW = NW + SE. If at least three corners lie above the MAD (or two above and one on), then NW + SE > NE + SW. If at least three corners lie below the MAD (or two below and one on), then NW + SE < NE + SW. If two corners lie above and two lie below the MAD, then we cannot draw any conclusions.
If the entire cost matrix in a linear assignment problem is submodular (resp., supermodular), then the matrix is said to have the Monge property (resp., anti-Monge property) [3] . The minimal cost for a Monge matrix is attained by summing along the main diagonal. To our knowledge, mixed Monge matrices, i.e., matrices satisfying Properties 2 and 3, have not been studied before.
An alternative formulation of the linear assignment problem uses permutation matrices. Given a permutation π of the elements {1, 2, . . . , n}, let M π represent the matrix with a one in position (i, π(i)) for all i and 0 everywhere else. We want to minimize the cost of the permutation,
We will frequently refer to the permutation π and its permutation matrix M π interchangeably.
Results on mixed Monge matrices
A considerable amount of progress toward the optimal strategy can be made using only the properties stated in Lemma 1, without reference to the precise values of P i j .
Theorem 2 (Shape of the optimal solution [6]). If π is an optimal permutation for a linear assignment problem with a mixed Monge cost matrix, then the permutation matrix M
π must satisfy the following conditions.
1.
The main antidiagonal has only zeros.
All the nonzero elements above the main antidiagonal form an increasing sequence (i.e., they run from SW to NE, but need not lie on a straight line). 3. All the nonzero elements below the main antidiagonal form a decreasing sequence (i.e., they run from NW to SE, but need not lie on a straight line).
Proof. To prove statement 1, consider any permutation matrix with some but not all of its nonzero entries on the MAD. Pick two adjacent rows, one with a one on the MAD and one with a one off the MAD. Swap those two rows. The resulting permutation always has a lower cost, either by property 3b or 3c. Next, if all of the nonzero entries are on the MAD, then swap any two rows. The resulting matrix has equal cost (property 3a) and does not have all its entries on the main diagonal. We have just shown that such a matrix is not optimal. Finally, if none of the nonzero entries lie on the MAD, then the row-swapping argument leads directly to statements 2 and 3. Proof. It suffices to show that for any permutation π with a permutation matrix M π that satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2 and is not symmetric, there is another permutation that has a strictly smaller cost, i.e., the nonsymmetric permutation π is not optimal. First, M π must be nonsymmetric below the main antidiagonal, i.e., there exist i 1 and i 2 with
(This is true because the increasing condition from Theorem 2 gives us only one way to fill in the above-MAD elements once the below-MAD elements are known. If the below-MAD part of the matrix is symmetric, the above-MAD part will also be.) Write π in cycle
be the identity permutation.
We will determine three permutations τ 1 , τ 2 , and τ 3 which collectively contain the same nonzero entries as π, π , and ε. Then we must have
We proceed as follows. If k is even, then define
Let τ 3 be the "bad" transposition (i 1 , i 2 ) , i.e.,
so that at least one of τ 1 and τ 2 has a strictly lower cost than π.
Define a permutation to be eligible if its associated matrix satisfies the conclusions of Theorems 2 and 3, such as the second and third matrices of Figure 2 . All of its nonzero entries below the MAD must lie on the main diagonal. Reading these entries from SE to NW, we get a string of n/2 zeros and ones, which we call the string representation of π. The first entry of this string is always 1. Thus there are 2 n/2 −1 eligible permutations, a vast reduction from the n! possible solutions we started with. We denote the set of eligible permutations by E.
Putting these results back into the context of One-Round War, here is what we can say so far about the optimal strategy for Player 2. As noted before, we divide our cards into two sets: the sacrificial cards (which correspond to entries of the permutation matrix below the MAD) and the ringer cards. The sacrificial cards are played in reverse order of strength, and the ringer cards are played in proper order. The weakest card is always sacrificed against the opponent's strongest. If we choose to sacrifice our ith weakest card, it must be played against the opponent's ith strongest card.
For example, for n = 7 there are four eligible strategies, with string representations (1, 0, 0), (1, 1, 0), (1, 1, 1), and (1, 0, 1) . Referring to the P matrix (1), the cost of strategy (1, 1, 0) (the same one illustrated in Figure 1 ) is 3432 + 3382 + 330 + 456 + 491 + 456 + 330 = 8876. This is the best of the four eligible permutations and therefore, by Theorems 2 and 3, it is the optimal strategy.
The strategy (1, 0, 1) is of particular interest, because it contains a gap, a substring of zeros surrounded by two ones. Ruling out gaps is the single most difficult part of our solution of One-Round War. In this case, the gap strategy has cost 3431 + 2941 + 792 + 456 + 491 + 456 + 792 = 9359, which is clearly not optimal.
It is natural to conjecture that the cards to be sacrificed should be the worst k cards for some k, i.e., the optimal solution has no gaps. But before we attempt to prove this, it turns out to be useful to solve a subsidiary problem first: What is the optimal number of cards to sacrifice in a gap-free permutation?
Optimal number of cards to sacrifice
Define the m-antidiagonal as the elements (i, j) for which i + j = m + 1 (so that the main antidiagonal is the n-antidiagonal). The conjecture that the cards to be sacrificed should be the worst k for some k is equivalent to saying that the optimal permutation matrix has nonzero elements on the m-antidiagonal for m = n − k and on the main diagonal from element (m + 1, m + 1) to element (n, n). Let S m = m j=1 P m+1− j, j be the sum of the elements of the cost matrix on the m-antidiagonal.
The cost of the strategy that sacrifices the worst k cards is S m + n j=m+1 P j j . The difference between the costs of the strategies that sacrifice the worst k + 1 cards and the worst k cards is P mm − S m . If this difference is positive, then we prefer to sacrifice the worst k cards. We can show that as m increases (equivalently, as k decreases), this difference is initially positive and then negative. Thus it is straightforward to find the best number of cards to sacrifice among all gap-free eligible permutations. 
Thus, the strategy that sacrifices the weakest k * (n) = n − m * (n) cards is optimal among gap-free eligible permutations. We note that
This corrects a minor error in [5] , where the last summation symbol was omitted. For instance, to compute k * (7), we only need to look up the 7th and 14th rows of Pascal's triangle. We compute that so k * (7) is at most 2. Thus we conclude that strategy (1, 1, 0), sacrificing the two weakest cards, is the best gap-free eligible permutation for the seven-card game.
From the example you can see that the squared terms typically have little effect on the value of k * (n). It is convenient to define a simpler approximation,
The following bounds hold for k(n) for n sufficiently large [5] .
Lemma 7 justifies using k(n) as an approximation to k * (n). In fact, for all of the cases we have calculated (up to n = 500), k(n) = k * (n). Together, Theorem 6 and Lemma 7 imply that for n ≥ 3, k * (n) < √ n ln n/2 + 1. Table 1 shows the exact values of k * (n) for n ≤ 40. Table 1 . Values of k * (n) (optimal number of cards to sacrifice) for 3 ≤ n ≤ 40. Optimal strategy
Now that we have identified an optimal gap-free eligible permutation, we return to the problem of showing that no permutation with gaps can do better. In [5] this "nogaps theorem" was proved for n ≥ 10 7 . In this paper we prove it for all n ≥ 3. One of the main reasons for the improvement is the following lemma, discovered by the first author. Recall that E represents the set of eligible permutations.
Lemma 8. Any π ∈ E in which the last k cards are sacrificed for k
Proof. Given such a π, we will compare it with an otherwise identical strategy π for which only the last k − 1 cards are sacrificed. The string representations for π and π have the following forms:
That is, the initial string of ones has length k for π and length k − 1 for π , the asterisk represents (possibly many) terms that could be either 0 or 1, and the last 1 occurs in the r th position. We will prove by induction on r that V (π) > V (π ). First, if r = k, i.e., there is no gap, then the inductive hypothesis holds by the definition of k * (n). For r > k, assume the inductive hypothesis holds for all s with k ≤ s < r . Now we define two new eligible permutations, σ and σ , which are simply π and π with the terminal one in the r th position replaced by zero: (1, . . . , 1, 1,  * , 0, 0, . . .), σ : (1, . . . , 1, 0,  * , 0, 0, . . .) .
By a direct computation we find that [V
can be written as a sum of expressions of the form (NW + SE − NE − SW), where the labels NW, etc. refer to the corners of 2 × 2 submatrices of P that lie above the MAD. By the supermodularity of P, every one of these expressions is positive, hence
where the last inequality follows from the inductive hypothesis.
We will now sketch the remainder of the proof of the no-gaps theorem. More details are given in the Supplementary Online Materials.
Consider an eligible permutation with a gap π ∈ E. Its string representation has the form (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0, 1, . . . , 1, 0, *) with k ones, followed by i − k zeros, followed by n + 1 − i − r ones, followed by at least one zero. The notation is chosen so that M π rr = 1 and M π r −1,r −1 = 0. In the case r > n/2 + 1, this does not require any comment, but if r = n/2 + 1, then the string ends with the last one and we need a separate justification for the claim that M π r −1,r −1 = 0. In brief, this element is either on the MAD or a two-row swap will put a one on the MAD without increasing the cost. Either way, Theorem 2 implies that π is not optimal if M π has a one in position (r − 1, r − 1). Now we will compare π with two permutations, π and π described below, and show that at least one them has a lower cost than π. Focus on the second substring of ones. The first permutation is obtained by sliding the first one a step to the left, i.e., For simplicity, consider the case r = n − i, i.e., when the second string of ones consists of a single one. The general case is technically a bit more complicated but does not require any fundamentally new ideas. Now all the relevant information about π is contained in three variables, n, i, and k. We wish to show that
First, let us summarize three inequalities that we already know about n, i, and k. (That is, we do not need π at all.)
can be written in terms of
To be precise, we have
It follows immediately that either −C ik or C i+1,k must be positive, and therefore that either π or π has lower cost than π. This completes the proof that π is not optimal. This highly abbreviated summary glosses over some very important points. At minimum, we must explain how we prove (3).
When we expand the left-hand side of (3) and factor out the terms that are common to both 1 − C ik / n i 2 and 1 − C i+1,k / n i+1 2 , we are left with a rational function in the variables n, i, and k. Its denominator is positive and its numerator is the degree four polynomial
After a very extensive rearrangement of terms (see Lemma SM11 in the Supplementary Online Materials),
The first summand is positive and the second and third are negative. Inequalities (B) and (D) imply that the positive part of (4) is bounded below by a multiple of n 3 . On the other hand, by inequality (C), the negative terms in (4) are bounded above by a multiple of k 3 n, and hence are bounded above by a multiple of n 5/2 (ln n) 3/2 . Thus, for sufficiently large n, the positive terms must dominate.
The remainder of the proof comes down to working out how large is "sufficiently large." We greatly improve the previously known n ≥ 10 7 condition [5] with n ≥ 6. The proof splits into two steps. For n ≥ 41, we can prove that A(n, i, k) > 0 by a sufficiently careful use of analytical estimates in combination with inequalities (B), (C), and (D).
For small values of n, namely 6 ≤ n ≤ 40, it makes more sense to use the exact values of k * (n) listed in Table 1 instead of the inexact upper bound given by inequality (C). We fix each n in turn to obtain a polynomial A n (i, k) and then prove (with a modest amount of computer assistance) that each of these polynomials is positive in the relevant range, n/4 + 1 ≤ i ≤ n/2 − 1 and 1 ≤ k ≤ k * (n). We summarize these results in our final theorem. The optimal strategy is unique if P m * (n)+1,m * (n)+1 − S m * (n)+1 < 0. In the highly unlikely event that P m * (n)+1,m * (n)+1 − S m * (n)+1 = 0, there are exactly two optimal solutions; the second is to sacrifice the last k * (n) − 1 cards. We conjecture that this situation never arises.
Although finding the optimal strategy for any individual n is a purely algebraic problem, the above solution for all n depends upon an inequality, k < √ n ln n/2 + 1, that involves a transcendental function. The source of this inequality is the central limit theorem, or more precisely the rate of convergence of the binomial distribution to the normal distribution. That gives us very precise control over the sums of binomial coefficients that appear in (2).
Hungarian algorithm
Any experts on combinatorial optimization reading this paper have surely asked by now, "Why not just apply the Hungarian algorithm?" That was, in fact, the question the first author asked after reading about this problem in the Numberplay blog.
The Hungarian algorithm is a general-purpose method for solving linear assignment problems. It is simple, easy to program, and quick (we highly recommend it as a topic for undergraduates who know linear algebra). The algorithm will lead to an optimal solution for any instance of One-Round War, but it does not necessarily provide any insight into the general form of the solution, as we have presented here.
However, Theorem 3 inspired us to develop a modified version of the Hungarian algorithm that preserves symmetry throughout. The Hungarian algorithm repeatedly requires the user to identify as a pivot element the smallest positive entry in a "reduced cost" matrix. By appealing to the very same inequalities such as (3) presented in the direct proof above, we are able to show that the sequence of pivot elements follows a very regular pattern, ultimately providing an alternative proof of the optimal strategy (details are included in the Supplementary Online Materials). Because this proof is predicated on the same inequalities, it cannot be said to be in any way "simpler" than the one presented above.
